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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports on the use of carrot (positive) and stick (negative) incentives as 
methods of increasing effort among members of work teams.  We study teams of four members 
in a laboratory environment in which giving effort towards the team goal is simulated by 
eliciting voluntary contributions towards the provision of a public good.  We test the efficiency-
improving properties of four distinct environments:  monetary prizes given to high contributors 
versus monetary fines assessed to low contributors, where high/low contributor is defined first in 
terms of absolute contributions and then in terms of contributions relative to abilities—which we 
call handicapping.  Our results show that both carrot and stick can increase efficiency (i.e., 
contributions) levels by 10-28%.  We find that handicapped incentives promise the highest 
efficiency levels, and when handicapping is not used penalties may be more effective than 
prizes.  The implications for work teams and suggestions for practical implementation are 
discussed. 
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 While work teams have risen dramatically in popularity over the last decade, there is still 
no consensus as to the proper way to motivate individual team members.  The potential for 
shirking and free-riding on the efforts of other team members limits the effectiveness of 
compensation purely based on team output, while individual piece-rates do not provide 
cooperative incentives.  More sophisticated methods of compensation might involve some 
combination of payments based on both individual work as well as team output (e.g., profit 
sharing, productivity gainsharing, or individual bonuses).  The focus of this paper is the use of 
positive versus negative incentives—the carrot versus the stick—in motivating team members to 
contribute more towards the group goal.   
We report on a series of experiments that document significantly higher group giving 
when carrot or stick incentives are used.  The framework used for analyzing the work team 
problem that motivates this study is a public goods framework (see Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
for an early notice of the work team/public good connection).  Contributions towards provision 
of a public good are interpreted as team work effort, while token endowments are interpreted as 
ability.1  Team effort (contributions) generates output (payoffs) solely to team members and not 
to any employer in our framework—we therefore focus on intra-team behavior and response to 
incentives as opposed to the interaction between a team and an employer.  Team members are 
also asymmetrically endowed with tokens to simulate the differing abilities that members of the 
same work team may possess.   
In our experiments, the experimenter knows each individual’s contribution towards the 
team output, and this may not be true of all institutions in which employers may desire to pay 
based on team output.  Monitoring can, for a cost, improve an employer’s knowledge of each 
individual’s contributions towards the team output, and our findings indicate that such 
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monitoring will be desirable for at least some employers.2  There are, however, some real world 
instances of work teams in which an individual’s contribution towards the team goal is 
observable at little or no cost.  Professional team sports such as Major League Baseball are one 
such example.  There is at least some public goods component to the overall payoff of these 
athletes, such as improved quality of team play, better chance of winning a championship, etc.  
Individual player statistics are well publicized and utilized by team managers to allocate various 
types of individual rewards and penalties (e.g., demotion to the minor leagues or a promotion to 
the starting lineup).  Our study, though not general to all work team situations, covers an 
important class of work team environments, and our findings may have implications to the 
broader class of team institutions. 
Our results show that rewards or penalties based on an individual’s contributions relative 
to endowment (i.e., handicapped incentives) are usually the most effective in eliciting higher 
team contribution levels.  The additional efficiency improvement due to certain handicapped 
incentives shows that, while a handicapped incentive scheme would be more costly to 
implement, employers can often expect to receive more team effort in return.  A key result of this 
study is that different types of incentives interact differently with handicapping.  For example, 
with no handicapping we find that negative incentives—e.g. a monetary fine—increase 
efficiency by 6% more than positive incentives—e.g., a cash bonus. 
  We offer these results not only as support for incentives of all types, but also as 
evidence of their differing complementarities with handicapping.  And, while these incentive 
plans are costly in general, we find that they increase group wealth by an amount greater than the 
size of the “prize” in the carrot plans (see also Dickinson and Isaac (1998)).  In other words, 
these plans are not only efficiency enhancing but they may be self-funding.3   
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 In exploring a variety of motivation strategies, we should note the existence of penalties 
in a variety of settings.  Many examples can be found of firms using negative incentives as a 
method of eliciting effort:  verbal warnings, unpaid leave-of-absence, demotion, dismissal, etc.  
Pryor (1984) gives evidence from the 1980’s that in 44% of nonunionized manufacturing firms 
(and 25% of unionized firms) more than 5% of workers are fired annually for poor performance.  
A work team example is found in Johnsonville Foods’ use of work teams in the mid-1990’s, 
where employee motivation included the occasional return of designated bonus money as a way 
of penalizing some team members.  Military boot camps, religious schools, and traditional 
parental discipline are other institutions notorious for the use of negative incentives for 
motivation.  While monetary penalties are not typically used in the workplace, it is clear that one 
could use different sorts of “fines” as an alternative method of eliciting the desired behavior.   
Related research using controlled laboratory experiments shows that penalties imposed 
by fellow team members can be effective in sustaining higher contribution levels (Ostrom et al 
(1992), and Fehr and Gächter (2000)).  Carpenter (2000) finds that penalties imposed by 
anonymous team members, "strangers", may not improve team contribution levels if team gains 
from an individual's contribution are relatively low.  Results from Fehr and Gächter (2000) show 
that fellow team member punishment is most effective when preserving the same group 
composition across decision periods, suggesting that long-term group cohesion may be a key 
factor in making internal sanctions most effective.  Sefton et al (2000) compares the effects of 
penalties and rewards internally imposed by team members, and their results show that team 
contributions are highest when allowing team members to penalize some and reward others as 
they choose.  Giving team members sanctioning and/or rewarding authority is, however, rare 
within the corporate culture of self-managed work teams, and many work team members report 
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no desire to determine fellow team members’ pay (WSJ, April 12, 1995).  The results from our 
experiments have perhaps more clear implications for commonly used work teams that utilize an 
external team manager to allocate pay.  Our comparison of a fixed prize and penalty allocated 
under well-defined contractual rules also eliminates fellow team members’ potentially 
“irrational” use of the authority to sanction, which has been observed in Fehr and Gachter 
(2000), Ostrom et al (1992), and Sefton et al (2000). 
Dickinson and Isaac (1998) report on a series of experiments that analyze team 
production by studying public goods provision.  What is original in their study is the 
introduction of individual monetary rewards or “prizes” for high absolute contribution levels in 
one treatment, and for high relative (to endowment) contribution levels in another treatment.  
Both treatments are found to significantly increase contribution levels compared to a baseline of 
no prizes, and rewarding individuals based on relative contribution levels increases group 
contributions by even more than does rewarding based on absolute contribution levels.  The 
apparent promise of calculated compensation schemes that introduce such individual rewards 
leads us to wonder about the possibilities and applicability of similarly calculated penalties for 
low levels of contributions.  This paper, in fact, extends from Dickinson and Isaac to look at the 
effects of such penalties. 
 We should also note that our use of both penalties and prizes into the team production 
environment creates a tournament element in the decision-making process.  Once workers are 
handicapped for ability levels, the tournament theory results from Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
would imply that a rank-order tournament exists as a theoretically optimal labor contract.  
Support of the predictions of tournament theory is found in Bull et al. (1987).  Our experiments, 
however, involve a combined method of payment to team members as opposed to giving one 
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payment per individual and so are not directly comparable to the Lazear and Rosen framework.4 
Schotter and Weigelt (1992) use controlled experiments to explore tournaments among 
heterogeneous-ability subjects.  When individuals faced differing cost-of-effort functions the 
authors find, among other things, that when the tournament rules are altered to favor the 
disadvantaged group, effort levels increased in the whole group.  Our results are consistent with 
these and with Dickinson and Isaac in that the creation of equity through handicapping actually 
increases efficiency.  One key difference is that Schotter and Weigelt create a Pareto optimal 
Nash equilibrium at full contributions in their experiments.  In this paper, we purposefully create 
an environment in which there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium at full contributions.5 
2.  The Experimental Environment and the Penalties 
 Our intent is to objectively compare the incentive effects of rewarding individuals with a 
monetary prize to those of penalizing individuals with a similar monetary fine.  The framework 
for the penalty structure we use follows the reward structure of Dickinson and Isaac.6  We 
calibrate the size of the prize and the penalty so that they do not create a pure strategy 
equilibrium prediction of higher contribution levels relative to the baseline.  The two prize 
treatments are called Absolute Prize and Relative Prize for the treatments that give a monetary 
prize to the individual who contributes the highest amount in absolute terms (Absolute Prize) and 
relative to endowment (Relative Prize).  The Relative treatment, therefore, refers to the incentive 
environment with handicapping.  Similarly, we will refer to the penalty treatments using the 
terms Absolute and Relative to describe no-handicapping and handicapping, respectively. 
 We first discuss the payoff functions and prize levels used in the prize treatments.  Teams 
are comprised of N=4 individuals per team, and individuals are given an endowment of tokens in 
each round of a multi-round set of decisions (a treatment).  Individuals are each randomly given 
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a different per round endowment of tokens, wi, (17, 19, 21, or 23), but a given individual’s 
endowment is the same in every round of a treatment.  Individuals also maintain their relative 
endowment rank for the entire experiment, such that high (low) endowment individuals remain 
so for all treatments.  Recall that these heterogeneous endowments of tokens represent abilities 
of different team members to contribute towards the group or public good.   
In a given round, each individual then makes a decision of how many tokens to keep in a 
private account which generates 1 cent per token for that individual, and how many to place in a 
group account which, for each token contributed, generates 1/2 cent for each member of the 
team.  As such, each individual has the dominant strategy incentive to not contribute any tokens 
to the group account and thus free-ride off other team members.  The group payoff, however, 
would be maximized if everyone contributes all tokens to the group account—this is the Pareto 
efficient outcome.  These are the classic multiperson Prisoner’s Dilemma incentives.  Per round 
payoffs for each team member i are represented by the payoff function 
(1) Ui=q(wi-mi)+a
i
im  
Here, wi is the endowment, mi is the number of tokens contributed to the group account (so 
mi
i
 is the size of the public good), and q and a are payoff conversion parameters that can be 
adjusted to alter the marginal payoffs of contributing tokens.  In equation (1), the first term 
represents the team member’s private account payoffs, and the second term represents the group 
account payoffs.  For our experiments described above, we have q=1 and a=1/2. 
 For the prize treatments, a prize P+ of size P+=$.20 is given for high absolute and relative 
contribution levels.  In the event that there is a tie for high contributions (either relative or 
absolute) among two or more team members, the prize is split evenly among those who are tied.  
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With P+=$.20 there is an incentive to free-ride since marginal gain of contributing a token to the 
group account is less than the loss in the absence of any prize.  Given the prize level, along with 
our tie-breaking rule, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the stage game for either 
prize treatment.7  Pareto efficiency remains at full contributions by all team members.  The 
payoffs under the Absolute Prize treatment are 
(2) 
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For Relative Prize, payoffs are also given in (2) if we interpret the >, =, and < conditions as 
referring to relative contributions. 
To proceed in constructing a penalty treatment that will compare with the prize treatment 
(with P+=$.20), we first start with a penalty of P-=$.20.  For the penalty treatments we endow 
each individual with an additional 10 tokens per round, which helps control for any wealth 
effects across treatments.  Finally, for the penalty environment to have the exact same marginal 
payoff incentives as the prize environment we penalize all team members who are not the 
highest contributor (i.e., we penalize the N-1 lowest contributors).  To penalize only the lowest 
absolute or relative contributor is actually a different incentive structure—though undoubtedly 
an interesting one.  In the event that Nt team members are tied for high contributions, each of 
those individuals would pay a 




 
t
t
N
N 1 portion of the penalty.8  The payoff to individual i under 
Absolute Penalty is 
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(3) 
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The differences in (2) and (3) are only in terms of the token endowments per round, and not in 
terms of the behavioral incentives of the treatments.  Interpreting the >, =, and < conditions in 
(3) as those for relative contributions shows payoffs for Relative Penalty.  Pareto efficiency is 
still at full contributions.  As in the prize treatments, there are 20 cents in marginal gains to be 
distributed among the team members, and so Pareto optimality is independent of whether 
incentives are a prize or an avoided penalty.  The proofs that we have no pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium prediction in either Penalty treatment are similar for those in the prize treatments.9  
The formal proofs are available upon request.10   
3.  Experimental Procedures11  
Experiments were hand run with one 4-person team in the room at a time.  Information 
on endowments and contributions of each team member is private information in these 
experiments.  In each round, team members make the allocation decision between the private and 
group accounts. Each experiment consists of all 5 treatments (baseline and the 4 incentive 
treatments) and, while the incentive treatments are always randomized in order, the baseline is 
always the first treatment.12  Each treatment consists of 8 rounds and so each experimental team 
member makes 40 decisions in the experiment.  Subjects were not aware of when or what the 
changes would be from one treatment to the next, nor that there would be five total treatments.13 
After allocation decisions have been made, the experimenter circulates through the room 
and documents each individual’s contribution of tokens to the group account.  Total 
 9 
contributions to the group account are announced and written on the blackboard, and team 
members referred to a Table of Payoffs from the group account which informed them what their 
own earnings would be in that round for all possible contingencies of tokens placed in the group 
account.14  Individual contribution levels were never revealed, and communication is not allowed 
during the experiments (team members are scattered in a large room with their backs facing each 
other to avoid any nonverbal communication).15   
The difference between the Baseline versus incentive treatments is that, once total 
contributions to the group account have been announced, the high contributor to the group 
account is announced.  Only the token amount (or percentage of contributions) is announced, 
however, and the individual who contributed that high amount is never identified.  For a prize 
treatment there is an announcement that “the individual who placed the high number (or 
percentage) of tokens in the group account will add $.20 to his or her earnings for this round.”  
We refer to the prize treatments as Absolute and Relative Prize for the non-handicapped and 
handicapped, respectively, approach to implementing the prize. 
As previously noted, we implement the penalty incentives by taking $.20 away from a 
subject’s earnings at the end of the round if he/she is not a high contributor.  To compensate for 
the income effect of this second type of penalty scheme, we raise each subject’s per round 
endowment of tokens by 10.16  We call the handicapped and non-handicapped version of this 
incentive structure Relative and Absolute Penalty.  An alternative way of implementing the 
penalties was explored but not reported in this paper (results are, however, available upon 
request).  The alternative approach was to endow each subject with an additional $.20 in startup 
cash, as opposed to the larger token endowment, and then all subjects who were not high 
contributors would forfeit the additional $.20.  While this could be considered a penalty, it is 
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actually payoff equivalent to our prize treatments.  Further, statistical analysis with all pooled 
data showed no statistically significant difference in behavioral responses when this method of 
penalizing was used versus awarding prizes.17  The true effects of penalties seem to be felt only 
when the penalty is internalized by the team member, a point to be noted when contemplating a 
real-world penalty incentive.18 
Announcements are made in all Penalty treatments so that individuals know whether or 
not they subtract some, all, or none of the $.20 penalty in that round.  For the Absolute Penalty 
treatment, the announcement is that “the individual who contributed X tokens will not subtract 
20 cents from earnings for this round.  All others will subtract 20 cents from earnings for this 
round.”  Appropriate adjustments were made in the Relative Penalty treatments, and the 
announcements of both penalties and prizes were altered appropriately in the event that more that 
one individual tied in contributing the most tokens (absolute or relative) to the group account for 
that round. 
While no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the stage game for the incentive 
treatments, there is the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium at complete free-riding in the 
baseline.  As such, the incentive treatments and the baseline are not fully comparable, but it will 
serve as a useful comparison to the incentive treatment in terms of team efficiency.  Total 
earnings for each team member in any round are the private plus group account earnings and, 
when applicable, the addition of any prize or subtraction of any penalty.  Once the experiment 
was completed, subjects were paid their earnings individually, in private, and in cash. 
4.  Results 
 A total of 10 experiments were run using undergraduates recruited primarily from 
introductory level economics courses at Colgate University in the spring of 1998.  The 
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experiments lasted approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes each.  In addition to earnings from 
participation in the experiment, subjects were also paid a $5 show up fee.  Average total payoffs 
for all subjects were $17.57, ranging from a high of $21.00 to a low of $14.75.  The aggregate 
experimental results are shown in Figure 1.   
It is apparent from Figure 1 that the incentive treatments are effective in raising team 
contribution levels.19  Contributions tend to be higher when handicapping is used, and all 
incentive treatments increase efficiency above the baseline.  Relative Prize appears to elicit the 
highest efficiency levels.  Table 1 shows the mean percentage contribution levels of each 
treatment for each of the ten experimental teams.  Nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-tests confirm 
that each treatment increases contributions (i.e., efficiency) relative to the Baseline (p=.05).  Of 
course, we have previously noted that the treatments create mixed strategy equilibria at positive 
contributions, but the increased contributions in the incentive treatments are nonetheless 
indicative of the value of incentives in environments where free-riding may otherwise dominate.   
 We also test for behavioral differences within the incentive treatment.  U-tests indicate 
the following:  RelPrz increases contributions compared to RelPen (p=.05), RelPrz increase 
contributions compared to AbsPrz (p=.01), there is no statistically significant difference in mean 
contribution levels in AbsPen and RelPen, and AbsPen has mean contribution levels marginally 
insignificantly higher than AbsPrz (p=.11).  Keep in mind, however, that the nonparametric 
analysis fails to control for many other potential determinants of contribution levels.  We 
mention this since the parametric analysis, to be discussed shortly, finds a statistically significant 
different in comparing AbsPrz and AbsPen.  In fact, this is a key result of this study. 
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Intragroup variance in contributions 
In addition to the basic efficiency results, employers managing work teams are 
presumably interested in the cohesion of the work team.  One factor that might threaten this 
cohesion would be an incentive scheme that created a wide gap between effort levels of the high 
and low effort supplier in the team project.  Figure 2 shows average contributions by endowment 
levels for all experiments.  It is apparent that the dispersion in contribution levels is larger in the 
incentive treatments compared to the Baseline (p=.01 in the Mann Whitney U-tests on the 
aggregate differences).20  Further, non-handicapped incentives seem to increase this variance by 
even more (p=.05 in comparing AbsPen and RelPen, and p=.10 in comparing AbsPrz and 
RelPrz). 
Figure 3 highlights another interesting detail of the aggregate results.  Figure 3 shows the 
distributions of contributions for each endowment level, averaged across all experiments.  From 
this we see that contributions follow a bimodal distribution—team members most frequently 
contribute all or nothing.  How realistic is it that actual workers either try as hard as they can or 
shirk completely?  While such extremes are probably not very realistic, we could easily interpret 
zero contributions being effort at the minimum required level for employment.  The decision in 
the experiment would then be analogous to individuals choosing how much above minimum 
required effort they will supply towards the team’s goals.21  It is then more sensible that team 
members might contribute the minimum expected amount when they feel that the benefits of the 
incentive program are out of reach, while others might try their hardest.   
Treatment Effects and Behavioral Model 
For a basic test of the treatment effects we model individual team member contributions 
as a function of the treatment within the experiment as well as the round within the treatment.  It 
 13 
has been noted that these incentive experiments involve a more complicated “game” than the 
simple baseline contributions exercise.  While this paper does not attempt to construct a 
theoretical model that would generate our experimental outcomes, we include a second empirical 
specification that includes additional behavioral variables.  The behavioral variables chosen 
reflect the potential importance of how individuals respond to what happened in the previous 
round:  whether they benefited from the incentive treatment (e.g., won the prize), whether they 
shared the benefits, whether they could have received the benefits (had they given more), 
cumulative experimental earnings from previous rounds, and also own-contributions relative to 
the average of the remaining 3 team members.22   
A final variable, Dispar, measures the revealed disparity in token endowments during 
non-handicapped treatments.  The announcement of highest number of tokens contributed during 
the non-handicapped treatments provides some (imperfect) information on ability levels.  
Suppose, for example, that your token endowment is 19, and the high contributor in the round is 
16—Dispar would then be equal to zero for the next round and all subsequent rounds until the 
high contributor gives, say, 22 tokens.  For the next round Dispar is then equal to 3 (22-19) for 
that individual for all subsequent treatment rounds, unless a high contributor gives more than 23 
tokens, etc.—for handicapped treatments, Dispar is set equal to zero for all rounds since no 
endowment information is revealed.  A larger Dispar for an individual implies that he/she cannot 
contribute the most if others contribute most or all of their endowments.  A simple theory based 
on expected utility can easily show that once a lower endowment team member becomes aware 
that a higher endowment members exists in the group the perceived probability of enjoying the 
benefits of the incentive decreases.  Therefore, the variable Dispar controls for the level of 
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information on endowments that is currently available to each team member.  Table 2 gives the 
variables and their descriptions.   
The individual-level contributions equation is estimated using a random effects model.  
The assumptions implicit in such a model are that the team members drawn for these 
experiments were sampled from a large population of individuals whose individual specific 
constant terms are randomly distributed across individuals.  Lagrange multiplier and Hausman 
tests of the contributions equation support this modeling of the constant term.  Table 3 shows the 
results of these GLS estimations.  The results of the basic test of treatment effects and the full 
behavioral model are shown in the second and third columns of Table 3, while the last two 
columns reestimate these models including a control for revealed endowment information.  Note 
that several of the variables in Table 2 explicitly account for the fact that individual observations 
within a given team are not independent of one another.23   
Consistent with the existing literature on voluntary contribution mechanism experiments, 
the coefficient on Round suggests a decay in contributions as the final round of the treatment 
approaches, and its magnitude suggests that individual contributions will decline by 14% over 
the course of the treatment, ceteris paribus.  The constant term suggests that about 42% of an 
individual’s tokens are contributed in the first round of the baseline treatment independent of 
other behavioral factors. 
From Table 3 we also see that the treatment variables are all statistically significant and 
positive.  The magnitude of each coefficient represents that treatment’s contribution to total team 
efficiency or contributions (since these results assume that each team member would increase 
percentage giving by the same amount).  As such, the second and third columns of Table 3 show 
that efficiency is increased by the incentive treatments from 10 to 28%, depending upon the 
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treatment and specification.  In column two we see that nonhandicapped incentives offer smaller 
efficiency gains on average than handicapped incentives.  Column four, however, sheds some 
light on this issue.  Column four shows the results from the estimation when controlling for the 
level of endowment information revealed to team members through the high contribution 
announcements.  Comparing columns two and four of Table 3 we note that efficiency 
improvements are actually larger in the nonhandicapped treatments once we control for the level 
of endowment information.  Columns three and five of Table 3 show the results from similar 
estimations which include the additional behavioral variables.  What this implies is that the 
higher average efficiency of the handicapped treatments is due to the fact that each team member 
knows that he/she could earn the prize (or avoid the penalty) from contributing—no matter how 
high another team member’s ability may be.  Contributions are, on average, lower in the non-
handicapped treatments because lower ability individuals realize that they can be out-contributed 
by higher ability individuals. 
By combining the effects of Dispar and the non-handicapped treatments in columns 4 
and 5 of Table 3, we arrive at roughly similar estimates of efficiency gains from identical 
treatments in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.  In other words, the non-handicapped treatment effects 
shown in columns 2 and 3 can be subdivided into separate effects for each endowment level.  
The effect of such non-handicapped incentive is to greatly increase contributions of the higher 
endowment team members while only slightly increasing, or sometimes even decreasing, 
contribution levels of the lower endowment team members.24  In practice, however, suppressing 
the information on the efforts of a prize winner is not likely.  While controlling for revealed 
endowment information is possible through statistical methods, the net effects of the various 
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incentive treatments are more logically compared by examining the estimations in columns 2 and 
3 of Table 3. 
Focusing on the models in columns two and three of Table 3, handicapped incentives 
improve efficiency the most on average.  However, when handicapping is not used internalized 
penalties are more effective than prizes or noninteralized penalties.  We reject the hypothesis that 
the coefficients on all of the incentive treatments are equal (p=.00).  Under the base specification 
of column two, we note that when handicapping is used, prizes generate a 12% larger efficiency 
gain than penalties (p=.00).  However, when no handicapping is used, penalties increase 
efficiency by 6% more than prizes (p=.06.  For the behavioral model in column 3, p=.05).  Also, 
if prizes are used they increase efficiency by 17% more when used with handicapping as 
opposed to no handicapping (p=.00).25  This result that penalties are more effective than prizes 
when no handicapping is used suggests that penalties and prizes, while substitutable to some 
extent in eliciting additional effort in team environments, have quite different complementarities 
with absolute versus handicapped levels of contributions.   
The introduction of additional behavioral variables decreases the magnitudes of the 
coefficients on the treatment variables, but not their significance or ordering.  It also 
substantially improves the explanatory power of the models.  In column three of Table 3, we 
note that several of the coefficients of the behavioral variables are statistically significant and 
their interpretation provides additional insights into team giving.  The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on Benefit is quite large in magnitude at .18.  As such, being the sole 
recipient of the benefits of a Prize treatment (or the benefits of a Penalty treatment by way of not 
having any earnings subtracted) increases one’s contributions by 18% on top of the incentive 
effects of the treatments themselves.  The coefficient on Share implies that the positive effects of 
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Benefit would be diluted slightly when sharing the benefits of any incentive treatment.  Team 
members apparently also feel some regret when they could have received benefits of the 
incentive program but did not.  In fact, the positive coefficient on Oppwin suggests that when 
this is the case, team members contribute an additional 11% in the next round.   
The final variable of behavioral interest, Deviate, is a significant determinant of 
contributions and the positive sign on its coefficient suggests that individuals contributing above 
their residual team average tend to contribute more in the following round, whereas those 
contributing less than their residual team average tend to contribute less.  The magnitude of the 
coefficient is consistent with Dickinson (1998).  Though apparently small, the magnitude of .01 
actually implies a nontrivial change in absolute levels of individual-level contributions.  For 
example, suppose that the residual group mean level of (absolute) tokens is 20 and you 
contributed 10.  Then deviate=-10, and the coefficient on Deviate implies that in the following 
round your contributions percentage will decline by 10%.  This implies a change in contributions 
of two to three tokens in the next round depending upon your initial endowment.  Its positive 
sign suggests that those who contribute the bulk of the team’s tokens will continue to do so while 
those who free-ride more than others will continue to do so, ceteris paribus.26   
 Finally, in the behavioral model including the control for revealed endowment 
information (column five), we see that some of the coefficients in column three were capturing 
the effect of the revealed ability information.  The significance of the coefficients on all 
treatment variables and most other coefficients is not affected by the inclusion of Dispar, but the 
coefficients on Oppwin and Benefit lose their significance. 
 5.  Implications and Concluding Remarks 
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These results have numerous implications for the work team manager.  A wide variety of 
incentive plans can increase work team effort.  In general, we find that employers or work team 
managers can expect to get what they pay for.  Implementing a handicapped incentive scheme 
requires ability information, but the cost of gathering the ability information is rewarded through 
10%-28% higher efficiency levels.  Equity is not, therefore, incompatible with efficiency 
(consistent with Schotter and Weigelt (1992) and Dickinson and Isaac (1998)).  This result is not 
entirely due to better incentives with handicapping, but in part due to the fact that 
nonhandicapped incentives reveal ability information to team members.  The net result is that 
nonhandicapping provides smaller efficiency gains (11%-17%) and also a wider variance in 
giving within the team—the latter may negatively affect team cohesion.  We presume that a 
foundation for effective work teams is some sense of “togetherness”.  It is hard to imagine this 
persisting in an environment in which the effort supply of individual team members remains so 
asymmetric. 
Given that ability information is costly to gather, employers facing the highest costs of 
gathering information may be ex ante inclined to not use any handicapping.  It is an important 
implication of this paper that employers resolved to using absolute incentive mechanisms may 
improve efficiency the most through using penalties.27   
 For penalties to be an effective incentive device it is important that the individual 
internalize the penalty.  Our experimental method of accomplishing this is similar to assessing a 
monetary fine on all team members except the one who supplies the greatest effort during each 
period (e.g., fine all but the salesperson bringing in the most business).  Practically speaking, for 
those employees whose output is easily measured (e.g., sales or vegetable picking), and when it 
is quite costly to gather ability information (e.g., temporary or seasonal workers), such monetary 
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fines may promise the largest efficiency gains.  Alternatively, handicapping would be more 
feasible when dealing with those who have a large amount of data available on their work 
performance (e.g., professional team athletes), and our results suggest that prizes would be more 
effective than penalties in such instances.   
 In the case of both positive and negative incentives, the incentive programs may be self-
funding.  That is, the additional wealth generated by the introduction of the incentive program is 
more than the size of the incentive used.  Of course, this does not take into account the cost of 
gathering information of effort and/or ability, but it is a step towards making the incentives 
viable in the workplace.  In our experiments, when the team contributes 10 or more tokens over 
the amount contributed in the Baseline, the incentive is funded (since this generates 20 cents in 
additional group-wide wealth).  In our optimally matched incentive programs, Relative Prize 
increases team contributions on average by about 21 tokens (26%), and Absolute Penalty 
increases team contributions by about 14 tokens (17%)—both incentive programs could 
conceivably fund the incentive through some type of internal taxation.  This possibility is a clear 
area for additional research and experimentation. 
 While the possibility of an innovative type of penalizing that promises higher efficiency 
gains under certain circumstances is attractive and novel, we should not forget that such 
penalties may deteriorate employee moral.  Additional research must be expended to further 
explore the possibility of the penalizing programs.  Logistically, any contractual agreement that 
would allow for monetary fines to be assessed to workers should be common knowledge and 
specific as to the conditions under which this occurs.  These are important details to the 
successful implementation of any penalizing incentive program.   
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 A drawback of our public goods production function is that it implies independence of 
individual team inputs (as is true of most experimental public goods mechanisms).  In other 
words, team output, and therefore team payoffs, is immune to complete free-riders as long as 
other team members contribute additional effort.  A more realistic team production function 
might include a higher degree of team member interdependence.  An extreme case would be 
Y=A*min{y1,y2,y3,y4}(A=scale constant).28  How such a production function affects the 
marginal incentives to contribute is obviously important to fully understand how such 
interdependence might affect team outcomes.  Nonetheless, the degree of team interdependence 
may be quite important in identifying the best incentive environment. 
Finally, we have not tested the long-run properties of the incentive environments.  
Nonhandicapped incentives tend to increase the gap between the high effort individual and the 
rest of the team, whereas the handicapped incentive creates a broader base of interest for the 
employees since anyone can at least share in part of the incentive.  Nonhandicapped incentives 
may not encourage the work team cohesion that is typically desired.  Also, penalties may foster 
bad relations in the long-run between employer and employees.  These incentives may then be 
more effective in short-term work relationships.  This final point highlights another area where 
further study would be useful.   
 21 
References 
 
Alchian, A. and Demsetz H.  (1972)  “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.”  American 
Economic Review, 62, 777-795. 
 
Bull, C., Schotter, A. and Weigelt K.  (1987).  “Tournaments and piece rates:  An experimental study.”  Journal of 
Political Economy, 95, 1-33. 
 
Carpenter, J. (2000) “Punishing Free Riders: The Role of Monitoring Group Size, Second-Order 
Free-Riding and Coordination.” mimeo, Middlebury College. 
 
Dickinson, D. L. (1999)  “An Experimental Examination of Labor Supply and Work Intensities”  Journal of Labor 
Economics, 17(4) Part 1, 638-670. 
 
Dickinson, D. L.  (1998)  “The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Uncertain Group Payoffs.”  Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 35, 517-533. 
 
Dickinson, D L. and Isaac, R. M.  (1998) “Absolute and Relative Rewards for Individuals in Team Production.”  
Managerial and Decision Economics, 19, 299-310. 
 
Fehr, E. and Gächter S.  (2000) “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments.”  American Economic 
Review, 90(4), 980-994. 
 
Isaac, R. M. and Walker, J. M.  (1988b)  “Communication and Free-Riding Behavior:  The Voluntary Contributions 
Mechanism.”  Economic Inquiry, 26, 585-608. 
 
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A.  (1979)  “Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.”  Econometrica, 
47(2), 263-291. 
 
Lazear, E. and Rosen, S.  (1981)  “Rank-order tournaments as optimal labor contracts.”  Journal of Political 
Economy, 89, 841-864. 
 
“My Colleague, My Boss” J. S. Lublin.  The Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1995 pR4 col. 1. 
 
Nalbantian, H. R. and Schotter, A.  (1997)  “Productivity Under Group Incentives:  An Experimental Study.”  
American Economic Review, 87, 314-341. 
 
Ostrom, E., Walker, J. and Gardner, R.  (1992) “Covenants with and without a Sword:  Self-Governance is 
Possible.” American Political Science Review, 86: 404-417. 
 
Palfrey, T. R. and Rosenthal, H.  (1991)  “Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private 
Information.”  Games and Economic Behavior, 3, 183-220. 
 
Pryor, F. L.  (1984) “Incentives in Manufacturing:  the Carrot and the Stick.”  Monthly Labor Review, 107(7), 40-
43.  
 
Schotter, A. and Weigelt, K.  (1992)  “Asymmetric tournament, equal opportunity laws, and affirmative action:  
Some experiment results.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 511-539. 
 
Sefton, M., Shupp, R. and Walker, J.  (2000) “The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods.” 
Working paper, Indiana University Center on Philanthropy and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy 
Analysis 
 22 
 
van Dijk, F., Sonnemans, J. and van Winden, F.  (2001)  “Incentive Systems in a Real Effort Experiment.” 
European Economic Review, 45(2), 187-214. 
 
 23 
TABLE 1 
 
Mean Percentage Contributions by Treatment 
(aggregated over rounds) 
 
 Team #  
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average 
Baseline .13  .24 .72 .24 .33 .04 .57 .43 .31 .29 .33 
AbsPen .41  .37 .66 .51 .57 .34 .72 .49 .49 .50 .51 
AbsPrz .33 .47 .40 .47 .46 .43 .55 .32 .53 .51 .45 
RelPen .37 .32 .55 .55 .54 .48 .61 .28 .57 .55 .48 
RelPrz .44 .61 .72 .86 .58 .43 .69 .54 .55 .58 .60 
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TABLE 2 
variable names and descriptions 
 
VARIABLE NAME DESCRIPTION 
Givei (Dependent Variable) =% of tokens contributed to team (group) account 
 
Hi, MidHi, Midlow 
 
=Dummy variables for Highest, 2nd highest, and 3rd highest 
endowment levels in team 
 
AbsPen, AbsRelPen, AbsPrz, RelPen, RelIntPen, 
RelPrz, 
 
=Dummy variables for each incentive treatment 
 
Benefit 
 
=1 if individual received incentive benefits (by him/herself or 
shared) in previous round 
 
Share 
 
=number of individuals who shared in incentive benefits in 
previous round 
 
TotalEarn 
 
=subject’s cumulative earning (in cents) for the experiment in 
current round 
 
Round 
 
=the round of the treatment (i.e., 1-8) 
 
 
Oppwin 
 
=1 if individual had the opportunity to receive incentive benefits 
in previous round, but did not (e.g., top contributor was 10 
tokens, and your endowment is 17 tokens…you could have 
received benefits) 
 
 
Deviate 
 
=your deviation from the rest of the team’s average contribution 
level.  Your contribution (absolute) minus residual group mean 
contributions (absolute levels) 
 
Dispar 
 
=the size of the revealed disparity in token endowments in any 
prior round of the experiment 
Total Observations=1600 
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TABLE 3 
Random Effects Modeling of Individual-level % Contributions 
Dependent variable=Givei
 
 
Variable Coef. (p-value) Coef. (p-value) Coef. (p-value) Coef. (p-value) 
Constant .42 (.00)* .43 (.00)* .41 (.00)* .45 (.00)* 
AbsPen .17 (.00)* .16 (.00)* .32 (.00)* .27 (.00)* 
AbsPrz .11 (.00)* .10 (.01)* .26 (.00)* .22 (.00)* 
RelPen .16 (.00)* .12 (.00)* .16 (.00)* .15 (.00)* 
RelPrz .28 (.00)* .23 (.00)* .28 (.00)* .25 (.00)* 
Round -.02 (.00)* -.02 (.00)* -.02 (.00)* -.02 (.00)* 
Hi --- .003 (.96) --- -.07 (.33) 
Midhi --- -.08 (.26) --- -.13 (.06) 
Midlow --- .06 (.34) --- .04 (.59) 
Benefit --- .18 (.00)* --- .10 (.02)* 
Share --- -.03 (.04)* --- -.02 (.22) 
TotalEarn --- -.001 (.12) --- -.00 (.39) 
Oppwin --- .11 (.00)* --- .06 (.08) 
Deviate --- .01 (.00)* --- .01 (.00)* 
Dispar --- --- -.06 (.00)* -.04 (.00)* 
R2 .06 .15 .08 .16 
Observations=1600 
*Represents significance at the 5% level or better. 
 
 
 26 
FIGURE 1:  Aggregate Results 
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FIGURE 2 
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FIGURE 3 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                          
1 While not addressing the same issues as in this paper, a couple of other experimental studies 
examine work effort by conducting real effort experiments.  The interested reader is directed to 
Dickinson (1999), and van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden (2001). 
2 Since our results show that both rewards and penalties improve team contributions or effort, 
there will be some employers for whom the marginal cost of monitoring individual effort will be 
worth the marginal gain of additional team output.  While we suppress these employer benefits 
in our experiment, we presume that higher levels of team effort have positive effects on 
employer profits. 
3 While the purpose of this paper is to explore positive and negative incentives with and without 
handicapping, we do not address the various other forms of team incentives that exist.  The 
reader is directed to Nalbantian and Schotter (1998) for an experimental investigation some 
common incentive plans.   
4 Furthermore, Lazear and Rosen (1981) implies that a rank ordering of wage payments must be 
given for any number of team members, whereas our experiment offer only one incentive for the 
entire team. 
5 The existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria will be discussed later in the paper. 
 
6 Dickinson and Isaac’s framework differs in that they use 5-member teams where we use 4-
member teams.  The experimental parameters discussed in this paper are adjusted so that the 
marginal incentives are comparable. 
7 The prize/penalty size must be strategically chosen to generate a theoretical prediction of no  
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pure strategy Nash equilibrium (see Dickinson and Isaac).  Of course, mixed strategy equilibria 
will exist for this game.  Though it is prohibitively difficult to calculate a closed form solution 
for mixed strategy equilibria, the data generated are not consistent with mixed strategy 
predictions of this game with a simplified strategy space (i.e., contributions of 0%, 50%, or 
100% of the subject’s endowment).  These results are available from the author upon request. 
8 To see that this quasi-penalizing of team members tied for high contributions is equivalent to 
tie breaking under prizes, note that if Nt team members are tied for the high contribution level in 
the prize treatment, and some team members contributes one more token in order to gain the full 
prize, then the marginal prize gain of that additional token contributed is (Nt-1)/Nt of the prize.  
The loss to those who were tied and now are not high contributors is 1/Nt of the prize.  With the 
penalty environment, if Nt team members are tied with the high contribution level and one team 
member contributes an additional token, then the marginal gain is that the individual no longer 
pays the (Nt-1)/Nt share of the penalty.  The loss to the rest is that they are now simply “not high 
contributors” and will therefore pay the full penalty each.  Their loss is then 1/Nt of the penalty.  
Given that the penalty and prize are of the same size, the marginal incentives of the treatments 
are equivalent. 
9 The intuition behind the lack of pure strategy Nash equilibria is as follows:  Since some team 
member is always endowed with more tokens than all the others, it is in his best interest to 
always avoid the penalty (given the size of the penalty).  However, all other team members 
would then be best off by contributing zero due to the free-riding incentive.  Of course, if all 
others contribute zero, then the high contributor has an incentive to only contribute one token 
and still avoid the penalty, but this would induce contributions to spiral upward among team 
members until the individual with the largest token endowment wins—at this point the argument 
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repeats.  A similar argument follows for the Relative Penalty treatment as well as for the prize 
treatments. 
10 A referee has pointed out that the strategy space of all players is not public knowledge, as the 
game theoretic analysis assumes.  Our statistical results in Table 3 include an independent 
variable meant to capture team members’ response to the incomplete endowment information 
that is revealed over the course of a treatment. 
11 A complete set of all experimental instructions is available from the author by request. 
12 As we will see, the ordering of efficiency outcomes in Relative Prize, Absolute Prize, and 
Baseline treatment are identical to those in Dickinson and Isaac where they randomized the 
ordering of all treatments including the Baseline, and so we do not believe placing the Baseline 
first affects the results.  More importantly for our experiments, initial Baseline treatments helped 
“train” subjects in the basic institution before the added details of the penalty treatments are 
seen.   
13 The actual ordering of treatments in the 10 experiments were as follows (baseline=1, 
AbsPen=2, Absprz=3, RelPen=4, RelPrz=5): 12354, 14253, 12453, 15432, 13452, 12543, 15342, 
12543, 13542, 14352.  
14 In the actual experimental instructions and procedures, terms such as “group” and “private” 
accounts were labeled accounts X and Y.  Similar neutral language was used throughout the 
instructions and procedures.  The “Prize”, for example, was called the “additional 20 cents.” 
15 Previous public goods experiments have shown the efficiency-enhancing effects of nonbinding 
communication among team members (see, for example, Isaac and Walker (1988b) and Palfrey 
and Rosenthal (1991)), but the main purpose of these experiments is to explore positive versus 
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negative incentives as our first step towards evaluating the roles and complementarities of the 
incentives and the handicapping rule.     
16 This shift in endowments is also useful in mitigating any potential income effects since the 
new endowment levels are chosen so that expected earnings at the efficient outcome are identical 
under penalties and prizes.  We see this by noting that under prizes, total team earnings at the 
Pareto optimal outcome are 180 cents (160 cents of group account earnings plus the prize of 20 
cents).  Under penalties, total team earnings are also 180 cents (240 cents of group account 
earning minus 60 cents in total penalties.  This, because only one individual is not assessed the 
penalty meaning that 3 of 4 individuals are penalized 20 cents each round). 
17 An anonymous referee noted this point.  The data from these experiments and the statistical 
analysis are available from the author upon request. 
18 The notion of a reference point is a critical point in the prospect theory of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979).  Prospect theory implies that, from a given reference point, loss aversion would 
render negative incentives more effective than positive incentives in motivating individuals.  
While reference points and loss aversion may say something about the results in team work 
environments, the group dynamic compounds the problem.   
19 These results are also consistent with Dickinson and Isaac in that handicapped prizes increased 
efficiency by an amount greater than non-handicapped prizes. 
20 For these Mann-Whitney tests, the unit of analysis is the difference between the maximum and 
minimum average contributions for each round (note that this is slightly different then the 
aggregation by endowment levels shown in Figure 3).  For each round, maximum and minimum 
contributions are taken and averaged across all 10 experiments.  The gap still exists if one 
calculates the gap in percentage giving rather than absolute giving. 
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21 Under this interpretation, the strong free-riding incentive of the baseline treatment is similar to 
theoretical predictions that once minimum effort requirements are made, employees will 
contribute at minimum effort as an equilibrium prediction. 
22 The variable Deviate, which describes an individual’s deviation from the residual group 
average level of contributions is used in Dickinson (1998) and is a significant determinant of 
contribution levels in his voluntary contributions mechanism experiments. 
23 An alternative approach would be to simply estimate a model of treatment effect using the 
team contributions level as the unit of observation.  This modeling, while lacking any behavioral 
variables, yields coefficient estimates on treatment variables that are virtually identical in 
magnitude and significance as the estimates of Table 3 (results available upon request). 
24 Here, we calculate the effect of Dispar separately for the average team member by evaluating 
the coefficient of Dispar at the average value of Dispar for each endowment level (averaged 
across all rounds and experiments for the non-handicapped treatments).  When including the 
joint effect of Dispar and the nonhandicapped treatments, the percentage efficiency 
improvements for AbsPen, and AbsPrz for endowment levels high to low are, respectively, 
32,23,11,1 and 26,17,5,-5 in the base treatment effects model (column four), and 27,21,13,6 and 
22,16,8,1 in the full specification (column five).  As such, average team efficiency increases by 
16.75% and 10.75% in the AbsPen, and AbsPrz treatments of the base model, and by 16.75% and 
11.75% in the full specification.   
25 Results are all from F-tests of the pairwise difference in coefficients.  
26 Dickinson (1998) offers two explanations for the positive sign on the coefficient of Deviate.  
First, the positive sign will result if, as contributions decay through time, those who are above 
(below) average contributors experience a slower-than-average (faster-than-average) decay rate 
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in their contributions (this hypothesis was originally suggested by Stan Reynolds).  A second 
explanation is that below average contributors learn to free ride even more, while above average 
contributors may increase contributions in attempt to “stoke the fire” and get others to 
contribute.  
27 Perhaps it should not be surprising that institutions such as the military and catholic schools 
tend to lean toward negative incentives.  Such incentives may be complementary with the higher 
importance they place on absolute standards. 
28 This production function and the idea of including more team interdependence were suggested 
to me by Alessandro Rossi. 
